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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * *

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a national
banking association, and HOME
ABSTRACT COMPANY, a corporation,
as Trustee,
Plaintiffs & Respondents,
vs0

Case No, 14301

REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, INC.
et al 0 ,
Defendant

& Appellant*
* * * * * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
* * * * * *

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought to foreclose as a mortgage
a duly recorded trust deed given to plaintiffs to secure
Proudfit's obligations to the plaintiff Bank for repayment of a
large loan made by the bank and evidenced by certain promissory
notes, in which defendant-appellant Remington Arms Company, Inc,
claims priority for a judgment docketed against Proudfit after
the trust deed was recorded*
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DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court without a jury, and
the trial court found and determined that plaintiffsf trust
deed had priority over defendant Remington^ subsequently
docketed judgment and granted a decree of foreclosure which
denied Remington's claim of priority for its subsequent judgment lien#
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENTS
Respondents seek affirmation of the trial courtfs
judgmento
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as defendant-appellantfs statement of facts
is incomplete in some essential particulars, it becomes necessary for the plaintiffs-respondents to restate the facts to
supply the omissions and clarify the situation before the court0
Inasmuch as the transcript of the testimony was prepared and
forwarded as a separate volume after the original record had
been forwarded to the Supreme Court, we shall make references
to the original record by use of the letter,

lf

R,M and to the

transcript of the testimony of the sole witness by the use of
the letter "To"
In general, it appears that there is no dispute as
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to the controlling facts, which are set out in the findings
of fact made by the trial court, and so, for convenience, we
shall for our statement of facts summarize the trial courtfs
findings with references thereto, but with supplemental
references to the transcript where that would appear to be
helpful.
In 1967 the defendant Proudfit Sporting Goods Co.
(hereafter f'Proudfit") obtained a loan from the plaintiff Bank
in the amount of Forty Five Thousand Dollars ($45,000.00).

In

November of 1970, Proudfit had not completely repaid that loan
and requested a renewal and extension of its unpaid balance
and the loan of additional money.

The request was granted,

additional money was lent, and Proudfit executed and delivered
to the Bank its trust deed in the principal amount of Sixty
Three Thousand Dollars ($63,000.00), representing the balance
of the old loan plus the additional loan made at the time, and
secured the same by a certain trust deed conveying the property
in question to trustee Home Abstract Company as security for
the original and the additional new loans represented by a
renewal note then executed.

On May 12, 1971, the said trust

deed was duly recorded in the office of the County Recorder of

-3-
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of Weber County, Utah*

(Court's Findings Paragraph 1 & 2, R0

59 & 60, T. Page 8 Line 23 to Page 10 Line 12, and plaintiffs1
Exhibits B & C 0 )

It is important to note that the trust deed,

Exhibit C, specifically provides, at the bottom of the first
page and the top of the second page of said trust deed, that
it is given for the purpose of securing ''payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith,
c o . and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications
thereof o • ."In other words, it secured the indebtedness and not
merely the note which is evidence of the indebtedness.
Remington has a judgment lien upon the subject premises based
upon the judgment docketed December 15, 1971, some Seven (7)
months after the recording of the plaintiff Bank's trust deed,
(Court's Finding Number 10, R. 64.)

On June 19, 1972, Proudfit

was in default in the payment of interest accrued and payable
under the trust deed note Exhibit B and requested that the
plaintiff Bank renew its then indebtedness of principal and
interest by a new note.

The Bank granted the request and on that

day Proudfit Company executed and delivered to the Bank the
note, Exhibit D, "as a renewal and extension of its unpaid
obligations under the trust deed note of November 23, 1970,
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Exhibit Bo

(Court's Finding Number 3, R. 60 & 61o) As the

uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff's witness, Thomas
D 0 Deefshows, this transaction was a renewal of the loan and
note representing the same, and not a payment of the prior
note.

(T. 10, Line 13 to T. 11, Line 13o)

It should also be,

noted that the extension note, Exhibit Dfin its left hand
margin has a reference to this security in the terms of Mtrust
deed, guaranty, stock, gpa#lf
When Proudfit defaulted on this final extension note,
plaintiff Bank brought this foreclosure action alleging the
obligation evidenced by the trust deed note of November 23,
1970, Exhibit B, renewed by the renewal note of June 19, 1972,
Exhibit D, with the indebtedness represented by the notes secured by the trust deed, Exhibit C, and prayed for foreclosure
and that Remington's judgment lien be adjudicated

subsequent

and inferior to the trust deec^ and that the defendants, including Remington, having claims subsequent to the execution of the
mortgage, as encumbrances or otherwise, be barred and foreclosed
of all rights, claims or equity of redemption except as specifically provided by law0
Remington appeared and answered the complaint (R0 43
& 44), In essence the answer was merely a general denial plus

-5-
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an admission that Remington claims an interest upon the premises and a statement that the claim is by virtue of a judgment against Proudfit dated December 15, 1971, and a claim
that the judgment is superior to the claims of all other
parties.
It must be noted that nowhere in its answer does
Remington claim or allege the affirmative defense that the
original obligation to the Bank evidenced by the note and
trust deed of 1970, had been paid in whole or in part.
On the evidence and findings above outlined the
trial court found that the obligations of Proudfit to the Bank
represented by the Two (2) promissory notes were unpaid, and
were secured by the trust deed and entered a degree of foreclosure and a decree that Remington!s judgment lien of
December 15, 1971, was subject and inferior to the lien of the
trust deed recorded May 12, 1971, and foreclosed all of
Remington's rights under its lien as against the property in
question, saving only its right to redemption as provided by
law.

(R# 58 to 69).
This appeal followed,
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
REMINGTON JUDGMENT LIEN OF DECEMBER 15, 1971, WAS INFERIOR AND
SUBORDINATE TO RESPONDENT BANK'S RIGHTS UNDER ITS TRUST DEED
EXECUTED NOVEMBER 23, 1970, AND RECORDED MAY 12, 1971, AND THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Under Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, payment is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded, which
defendant Remington has not done0

Under these rules, which are

copied from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defense of
payment must be pleaded by one resisting plaintifffs claim, and
proof of payment is inadmissible under a general denial.

60 Am

Jur 2nd PAYMENT. Section 115, Notes 10 to 12. and Rees v 0
Archibald. 6 Utah 2nd 264. 311 Pac. 2nd 788. Note 9o
In the case at bar, all of the evidence is to the
effect that the trust deed in question secures and was intended
to secure the indebtedness, and not merely the note which was
evidence of the indebtedness.

As previously noted, the trust

deed provides that it was given "for the purpose of securing
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note
. . o and any extensions or renewals" thereof*

And the only

testimony presented to the court was to the effect that the
renewal note was given and accepted, not as payment, but merely
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as an extension of the previously existing indebtedness.

On

the evidence the trial court found (Finding Number 3, R. 60-61)
that Proudfit, in June, 1972, "requested that the plaintiff
Bank renew its then indebtedness, . „ by a new note, which
request was granted by plaintiff Bank.

0

» and at the same time

defendant Proudfit Sporting Goods Co. executed and delivered
to the Bank its certain promissory note. , , as a renewal and
extension of its unpaid obligations," under the previous trust
deed notec

(Emphasis Supplied.) The trial court having found,

upon uncontradicted evidence, that the new note was a "renewal
and extension" of the debtor's unpaid obligations under the
previous note, the findings of the trial court will be honored
by this Honorable Court under the universally followed rule
and practice.
And the finding that the new note was given as a
"renewal and extension" of the previously existing obligation,
is, by necessary inference, a finding that it was not executed,
delivered or received as "payment" of the previously existing
and continuing secured obligation.
The trial court's finding and conclusion that the new
note was in renewal of the existing indebtedness rather than in
payment thereof is strengthened by the law relating to the bur-
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den of proof and presumptions relating to payment.

In 55 Am

Jur 2nd MORTGAGES, Section 461 the rule is stated as follows:
Instead of their being a presumption of payment,
or settlement, of the original mortgage indebtedness, by the execution of a renewal note, and
thereby a release of the security, the presumption is that upon the execution of the new note
or bond the same security is available for payment . In such case the mortgagor bears the
burden of introducing evidence to show an alleged
agreement that the mortgage should be released
upon the execution of the new note.
In the case at bar all the evidence introduced supports the legal presumption that the new note evidenced only a
renewal and extension of time of payment of the original indebtedness, and not a payment thereof.

In this connection it is

probably worthy of note that in the case at bar the original
note was not cancelled and surrendered by the Bank to the borrower, as is customary in cases of payment of a note, but was
retained by the Bank and introduced in evidence at the trial at
the same time that the renewal note was introduced in evidence.
Under these circumstances it is the rule in Utah as
it is the almost universal rule elsewhere that the burden of
proof to prove by clear evidence that the renewal note was
intended as a discharge of the original note is on the party
who asserts a

claim that the note was discharged by renewal0
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In this case Remington has produced ne_ evidence to support its
claim that the new note paid and discharged the old, and all
the evidence introduced by the plaintiff is to the effect that
the parties did not intend to release or discharge the original
note by the taking of the renewal note.

See Gray v, Kappos. 60

Utah 300. 61 Pac. 2nd 613. which is substantially identical with
the case at bar.

See also Interstate Trust Company v, Headlund.

51 Utah 543. 171 Pac. 515. and the annotation at 52 ALR 1416 and
following.
Appellant cites only one case in support of its contention that the taking of the renewal note by the Bank was a
discharge of the indebtedness evidenced by the first note:
Hatten Realty Company v. Baylies. 42 Wyo. 69. 290 Pac. 561.
That case is clearly distinquishable.

In that case the only

evidence before the trial court was the sworn testimony that
the note in question was given "not merely to evidence the
amount due for the commission, but in absolute discharge thereof."
In the case at bar, as indicated, the only evidence before the
trial court was that the taking of the renewal note was not
intended to pay or release the indebtedness evidenced by each
of the Two (2) notes, each in turn.
CONCLUSION
As it clearly appears that all applicable law and
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a l l of the evidence support

the f i n d i n g s , conclusions and

judgment of the Honorable T r i a l Court, i t s judgment should be
affirraedo
Respectfully submitted,

Paul Thatcher, of
Young, Thatcher & Glasmann
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents
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